Tag Archives: voluntary belief

A moral universe

Part of a series which began with Fake news and the ethics of belief.

A few articles ago (see Tweedledum said to Tweedledee) I floated the idea of an evidence principle:

[EP1] It is wrong to believe anything, within the category of descriptive belief, on insufficient evidence.

I called it ‘EP1’ because I expected to have to amend it later on. I could then call any future versions EP2, EP3 etc.

EP1 is based on William Clifford’s principle, which I’m calling ‘CP’:

[CP] …it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.1

EP1 only applies to descriptive beliefs, unlike CP. But as we saw in Would you Adam and Eve it? Clifford clearly intended CP to be a moral principle, and EP1 will also be a moral principle.

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I just can’t help believing – or can I?

Part of a series which began with Fake news and the ethics of belief.

We have already mentioned the difference between descriptive beliefs and prescriptive beliefs, and the fact that Clifford’s principle (‘CP’) applies to both:

[CP] …it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.1

But another important distinction is between voluntary and involuntary beliefs.

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