In every UK election but one which I’ve voted in I have voted Labour. That’s since the early 1970s.
The single exception was December 2019 when I gave a tactical vote to the Liberal Democrats. As it happened that was the right decision. If another 5% of Labour voters in my constituency had done the same we would have unseated the sitting Tory MP.
Last month a UK High Court ruled that the health secretary, Matt Hancock, had acted unlawfully by failing to publish multi-billion-pound Covid-19 government contracts within the 30-day period required by law.
This didn’t particularly worry justice secretary Robert Buckland.
He said there are plenty of times when the government acts unlawfully, but “getting something wrong is not the same as deliberately flouting the law”.
What mattered, he said, was that the government did not break the same law twice.
Time we returned to our proposed evidence principle:
[EP3] If anything is morally wrong, then it is morally wrong to believe anything, within the category of descriptive belief, on insufficient evidence, in the absence of any conflicting and overriding moral imperative.
A principle like this lays on the believer a prima facie burden of justification for acquiring and/or holding descriptive beliefs. To justify a belief morally, the believer would need to demonstrate that either:
(i) It is supported by evidence; or
(ii) By not believing the believer would breach a conflicting and overriding moral imperative.